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Abstract
A major open question is whether computational strategies thought to be used during experiential 
learning, specifically model-based and model-free reinforcement-learning, also support 
observational learning. Furthermore, the question of how observational learning occurs when 
observers must learn about the value of options from observing outcomes in the absence of choice, 
has not been addressed. In the present study we used a multi-armed bandit task that encouraged 
human participants to employ both experiential and observational learning while they underwent 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We found evidence for the presence of model-
based learning signals during both observational and experiential learning in the intraparietal 
sulcus. However, unlike in experiential learning, model-free learning signals in the ventral striatum 
were not detectable during this form of observational learning. These results provide insight into 
the flexibilty of the model-based learning system, implicating this system in learning during 
observation as well as from direct experience, and further suggest that the model-free 
reinforcement-learning system may be less flexible with regard to its involvement in observational 
learning.
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Introduction
The ability to modify a behavior after experiencing its consequences is vital to the survival 
of any animal (Rescorla and Wagner 1972; Sutton and Barto 1998). However, learning 
solely by experiential trial and error can be time-consuming and dangerous and many 
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species have developed the ability to learn from other sources of information (Tomasello et 
al. 1987; Galef and Laland 2005; Whiten et al. 2005; Grüter and Farina 2009). Humans are 
particularly adept at such non-experiential learning, in particular that achieved by observing 
others take actions and receive their consequences, or observational learning (Berger 1962; 
Bandura 1977).
While a handful of studies have been conducted to examine the neural computations 
underlying observational learning (Burke et al. 2010; Cooper et al. 2012; Suzuki et al. 2012), 
this form of learning remains relatively unexplored compared to its experiential counterpart. 
In particular, studies investigating observational learning have focused on the situation 
where observers learn from the consequences of actions freely chosen by an observed person 
(Burke et al. 2010; Cooper et al. 2012; Suzuki et al. 2012). In that situation, there are 
multiple learning strategies that an agent could use to guide their choice. One strategy, akin 
to belief learning in economic games (Camerer and Ho 1999; Hampton et al. 2008), is to 
learn predictions for which action the observee is likely to choose based on the observee’s 
past choices, and to use that information to simply mimic the observee’s behavior. Another 
strategy is to learn the value of the outcome associated with each option as the observer 
experiences them, and to use that value information to guide one’s own choices. While there 
is some evidence to suggest that individuals are capable of learning predictions about others’ 
actions in either observational learning or strategic interactions (Hampton et al. 2008; Burke 
et al. 2010; Suzuki et al. 2012), much less is known about the brain’s ability to learn the 
value of different decision options through observation in the absence of free-choice in the 
actions being observed.
The goal of the present study was to address whether the human brain can learn about the 
value of stimuli through observation, in the absence of choice behavior in the observee that 
could be used to drive action-based learning. In the experiential domain, it has been 
proposed that learning about the value of decision options can occur via two distinct 
computational mechanisms: a model-free reinforcement learning mechanism, in which 
options are evaluated according to a “cached” history of their reinforcement and a model-
based learning mechanism, which acquires a model of the decision problem that it uses to 
compute the values of different decision options (Daw et al. 2005; Balleine et al. 2008). 
Although computationally simple, a model-free mechanism has limited flexibility. For 
example, a model-free agent will persist in choosing a option, even if its contingent outcome 
suddenly becomes no longer valuable. This is because, lacking a model of the environment, 
it has no representation of the current value of the outcome and relies solely on how 
rewarding the option has been in the past. In contrast, a model-based learning mechanism 
can adapt immediately to such a change, but it is more computationally complex for it to 
evaluate different available options because because, rather than relying a cached value for 
an action, it needs to consider all possible future implications of choosing that option.
Recent evidence suggests that both of these mechanisms may be present during experiential 
learning in humans. Model-free learning algorithms iteratively update the value of an action 
using reward prediction errors (RPE), which represent whether the outcome of taking that 
action was more or less rewarding than expected. Such RPE signals have been extensively 
reported within striatum during experiential learning in human neuroimaging studies 
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(McClure et al. 2003; O’Doherty et al. 2003; Gläscher et al. 2010). This literature suggests 
that the ventral aspects of striatum may be involved in encoding RPEs when learning about 
the value of stimuli as opposed to actions (O’Doherty et al. 2004; Cooper et al. 2012; Chase 
et al. 2015). In addition, there is growing evidence for the encoding of model-based state-
prediction errors (SPEs) by a network of frontoparietal regions (Gläscher et al. 2010; 
Liljeholm et al. 2013; Lee et al. 2014). These update signals reflect how surprising the 
outcome of a given action is, irrespective of its reward value, and can be used to update the 
probabilistic model of contingencies linking actions and the identity of their outcomes that is 
maintained by a model-based learning algorithm.
On the basis of evidence for the existence of both model-based and model-free learning 
signals in the experiential domain, a key objective of the present study was to establish 
whether learning about the value of different options through observation would involve a 
model-free mechanism, a model-based mechanism or both.
To address these questions, we recruited human participants to play a multi-armed bandit 
task (see Figure 1) while they underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). In 
the task, participants watched an observee play different colored slot machines. Importantly, 
because the observee only had a single slot machine to choose from on each trial, 
participants could not learn about the value of the slot machines from the observee’s actions; 
they could only learn by observing the payouts experienced by the observee. In order to 
assess whether the participants had learned from observation, they occasionally made 
choices between the slot machines they had watched the observee play. The chosen slot 
machine’s payout on these trials was added to the participants earnings but was hidden from 
them, which allowed us to incentivise learning from observation while preventing 
participants from learning about the machines experientially. In order to enable a direct 
comparison of the neural mechanisms underlying observational and experiential learning, 
we also included an experiential learning condition, which used a different set of slot 
machines. This condition was identical to the observational one, except that the participants 
themselves played and experienced the payouts. We then fitted model-free and model-based 
learning algorithms to participants’ choices in this task, and derived from these fitted models 
both reward prediction error and state prediction error regressors for use in our analysis of 
the participants’ fMRI data. While in this task the estimated values of the slot machines 
generated by the model-free and model-based algorithms coincide, their respective update 
signals do not, allowing us to distinguish their neural representations. Although the 
observational condition differs from the experiential condition in that the observational 
choice trials are more valuable than the observational learning trials, our effects of interest 
occur only on the learning trials in both conditions. Therefore, these differences would not 
be a confounding factor in our analysis.
We predicted that experiential and observational learning about the value of the different slot 
machines would share similar neural substrates, Specifically, we hypothesized that a 
frontoparietal network would encode state prediction errors during both experiential and 
observational learning, while the ventral aspect of striatum would be involved in encoding 
reward prediction errors during both experiential and observational learning.
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Materials and Methods
Procedures
Seventeen healthy young adults (mean age 23.3 years, SD 3.62 years, 8 males) participated 
in our neuroimaging study. All participants provided written informed consent. The study 
was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the School of Psychology at Trinity 
College Dublin.
Each participant attended Trinity College Institute of Neuroscience where they received 
instruction in the task (See Figure 1 and below). The participant was then introduced to a 
confederate (the observee), who they would subsequently watch playing a subset of the trials 
of the bandit task. Immediately before the task began, participants saw the experimenter 
supposedly test the video connection to the observee. The participant then completed the 
bandit task while undergoing MR imaging. In a post-scan debriefing, all participants 
reported having believed the video of the observee shown during the bandit task to have 
been a live feed. In reality, this video was recorded before the experiment.
Bandit Task
Participants faced slot machines that, when played, delivered a positive monetary payoff 
(€0.20) or nothing, with differing reward probabilities that changed independently and 
continuously over the course of the task. Each machine’s reward probability time-course was 
a sine curve that drifted between 0 and 100% plus a small amount of Gaussian noise on each 
trial (M = 0, SD = 6), with a random starting point and half-period randomly set between 
0.87 and 1.67 times the number of trials per condition. The reward probabilities were 
constrained to be correlated with each other at no greater than r = 0.02. The reward 
probability time-courses assigned to each condition were counterbalanced across 
participants. These slot machines were uniquely identifiable by their color. Three slot 
machines were assigned to an experiential learning condition and the remaining three to an 
observational learning condition. This separation of slot machines by condition allowed us to 
be confident that any neural effects of learning were solely attributable to experiential or 
observational learning. In each condition, one ‘neutral’ slot machine always paid €0.00 with 
100% probability. These neutral slot machines were intended to control for visuomotor 
effects, but were not ultimately utilized in the analysis, because our use of parametric 
regressors implicitly controls for such effects. In both conditions, participants faced a 
mixture of forced-choice trials, on which they could learn about the probability of payoff 
associated with each slot machine, and free-choice trials, on which they could use this 
knowledge to maximize their earnings. The use of forced-choice trials allowed us to exclude 
the possibility that in the observational condition participants were mimicking the choices of 
the observer rather than learning the value of each slot machine. Free-choice trials were 
included to allow us to assess whether participants were learning from the forced-choice 
trials. The task was blocked by condition, with 28 trials presented in each block. Free-choice 
trials made up one quarter of all trials, and were randomly interleaved among the forced-
choice trials. The task was presented in four runs of 3 blocks or approximately 17 minutes 
each.
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On forced-choice trials, a single slot machine appeared on the left or right side of the screen. 
The player had a maximum of two seconds to play the machine by indicating the side of the 
screen it was on, using a keypad. The slot machine lever was pulled and its reel spun for four 
seconds. The slot machine then disappeared and was replaced by either an image of a coin, 
indicating to the participant that they had earned €0.20, or an image of a scrambled or 
crossed-out coin indicating to the player that they had earned nothing. After two seconds the 
payoff image disappeared and the trial was followed by an inter-trial interval (ITI) with a 
duration drawn from a uniform distribution (minimum = 1 seconds, maximum = 7 seconds), 
during which a white crosshairs was displayed on a black background. On forced-choice 
trials in the experiential condition, the participant played the slot machine and earned the 
payoff it delivered, while on forced-choice trials in the observational condition the 
participant watched video of the slot machine being played by the observee. The observee 
was shown seated on the left side of the screen with their back to the camera in front of a 
monitor, which displayed the task. On these trials, the participant observed and did not earn 
the payoffs delivered by the slot machine. However, it remained in the interest of 
participants to attend to these observed trials because they would make choices between the 
slot machines shown on these trials on subsequent free-choice trials.
On free-choice trials, the two slot machines with a non-zero probability of reward from the 
current condition appeared on screen. Participants had a maximum of two seconds to choose 
to play one of the machines. The lever of the selected slot machine was pulled and its reel 
spun for four seconds. The inter-trial interval began immediately after the reel had finished 
spinning. As in forced-choice trials, the slot machines paid out according to their associated 
reward probability. The payoff was not displayed to the participant on free-choice trials in 
order to confine their learning to the forced-choice trials. This also had the benefit of 
preventing potential indirect effects of receipt of reinforcement, such as increased attention, 
from influencing participants learning through observation. The payoff earned on a free-
choice trial was however added to the participant’s earnings thus incentivising them to 
choose the machine they believed most likely to pay out.
If participants failed to respond to a trial within two seconds or responded incorrectly to a 
forced-choice trial in the experiential condition, the slot machine cues disappeared and were 
replaced by text stating ‘Invalid or late choice’. This remained onscreen for the remainder of 
the trial.
Imaging Procedures
Magnetic resonance imaging was carried out with a Philips Achieva 3T scanner with an 
eight-channel SENSE (sensitivity encoding) head coil. T2*-weighted echo-planar volumes 
with BOLD (blood oxygen level dependent) contrast were acquired at a 30 degree angle to 
the anterior commissure-posterior commissure line, to attenuate signal dropout at the 
orbitofrontal cortex (Deichmann et al. 2003). Thirty-nine ascending slices were acquired in 
each volume, with an in-plane resolution of 3×3mm, and slice thickness of 3.55mm [TR: 
2000ms; TE: 30ms; FOV: 240×240×138.45mm; matrix 80×80]. Data was acquired in four 
sessions, each comprising 516 volumes. Whole-brain high-resolution T1-weighted structural 
scans (voxel size: 0.9×0.9×0.9mm) were also acquired for each participant.
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Computational Modeling
Participants’ choices were modeled using both model-free and model-based learning 
algorithms. The model-free algorithm used was a variation on the SARSA reinforcement 
learning algorithm (Sutton and Barto 1998) together with a softmax decision rule. This 
algorithm iteratively updates a ‘cached’ value for taking an action in a particular context. 
The values of slot machines played by the participant and those played by the observee were 
updated in the same manner. Specifically, all slot machines began with an initial value of 0. 
If a given slot machine did not display a payoff on a particular trial, its value remained 
unchanged. If a slot machine i displayed a payoff on trial t, its value V was updated 
according to the rule:
where α, δRPE and O refer to the learning rate, reward prediction error and payoff value 
respectively.
In contrast, the model-based algorithm estimates the transition probabilities linking each slot 
machine to the two possible outcome states (reward and no reward). If a slot machine i from 
condition j led to an outcome state s on trial t, the transition probability T(i, s) was updated 
according to the rule:
where η and δSPE refer to the learning rate and state prediction error respectively. The 
estimated transition probability for the outcome state not arrived in was reduced according to 
 to ensure . The reward function over outcome 
states was defined as r(s)=1 if s is the reward outcome state, otherwise r(s)=0. The estimated 
transition probabilities were integrated with the reward function to compute the expected 
reward from playing a slot machine, i.e.
For both model-based and model-free learning algorithms, the predicted choice probabilities 
were obtained by passing the values of the slot machines available for choice to a softmax 
choice rule with temperature parameter θ. Due to the simple structure of the bandit task, the 
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model-free and model-based algorithms make identical behavioral predictions and the state 
prediction errors of the model-based algorithm were equivalent to the absolute value of the 
reward prediction errors from the model-free algorithm. Importantly, such unsigned 
prediction errors cannot be used to update the cached values maintained by a model-free 
learning algorithm because they do not reflect the reinforcing value of the outcome of an 
action. Separate learning rate and temperature parameters were fit to the pooled participants’ 
choices by maximizing the product of the model-predicted probabilities of the participants’ 
choices (maximum likelihood estimation) using fminsearch in MATLAB. The same 
parameter estimates were used for the model-free and model-based learning algorithms. We 
used the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to evaluate the learning algorithms according 
to their goodness of fit and complexity. Using this procedure, we selected a model with a 
single learning rate (BIC = 1428.6, learning rate = 0.14, θ = 6.18) that outperformed 
alternative models which allowed for different learning rates to be associated with the 
observed and experienced payoffs (BIC = 1434.7), or allowed different softmax 
temperatures to be associated with free-choice trials in the observed and experienced 
conditions (BIC = 1463.9). Prediction error values were derived from this fitted model and 
used in our analysis of the BOLD data. In order to assess the sensitivity of any neural effects 
to the fitted parameter values we also carried out analyses of the BOLD data with prediction 
error regressors generated using learning rates that deviated from the fitted values (0.05, 
0.25).
fMRI Preprocessing
All image preprocessing and analysis was performed using SPM8 (Wellcome Department of 
Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, London, UK; available at http://
www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). All functional volumes were corrected for differences in 
acquisition time between slices (to the middle slice), realigned to the first volume, and 
coregistered with the high-resolution structural image. The coregistered high-resolution 
structural image was segmented and normalised to Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) 
space using Diffeomorphic Anatomical Registration Through Exponentiated Lie algebra 
(DARTEL). The resulting transformation was applied to the functional volumes. The 
functional volumes were spatially smoothed with a Gaussian kernel (full-width at half-
maximum = 8 mm) and high-pass temporally filtered (60s).
fMRI Statistical Analysis
We analyzed the BOLD data using a GLM with participant-specific design matrices. Forced-
choice trials were modeled with a regressor indicating the onset times of the slot machine 
cue and another indicating the onset times of the payout cue. Forced-choice trials containing 
slot machines that deterministically paid out €0.00 were modeled with separate cue and 
payout onset regressors. A parametric regressor representing the trial-by-trial prediction 
error estimates obtained from the behavioral model modulated the payout onset regressor. 
Another regressor modeled the cue onset on free-choice trials. The experiential and 
observational conditions were modeled with separate sets of onset and parametric regressors, 
allowing us to control for any average differences in the BOLD data between the conditions 
that may be due to visual, social or motor factors. Each regressor was convolved with a 
canonical haemodynamic response function after being entered into SPM8 to generate a 
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design matrix. In order to be confident in our estimates of the effects of our regressors on 
BOLD, we tested for the presence of multicollinearity by measuring the Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) associated with each convolved regressor for each participant. This was 
obtained by performing OLS regression of each regressor on all other regressors. The VIF is 
then defined as 1/(1 − R2), where R2 is the coefficient of determination from this regression. 
The VIF values for all regressors of all participants were less than 2.5, substantially less than 
conventional cutoff values of 10, 20 or 40 (O’Brien 2007), indicating that multicollinearity 
was not present. We do not include regressors representing the times of decision in each 
condition because a VIF analysis indicated that these would introduce a high degree of 
multicollinearity into the design matrix (VIFOBS = 10.13, VIFEXP = 23.56; averaged across 
participants). This is attributable to the small temporal separation between the appearance of 
the cue and the time of decision leading to extremely high correlations between their 
regressors in both the observational and experiential learning conditions (ROBS = 0.94, REXP 
= 0.97; averaged across participants). The presence of such multicollinearity would prevent 
us from accurately distinguishing the effects of cue onset and decision onset. Motion 
parameters estimated during the realignment procedure were also included as regressors of 
no interest.
Maps of the voxel-wise parameter estimates for the regressors of interest were entered in 
between-subjects random effects analyses testing the effect of the regressors across the 
group. Unless otherwise stated, we report statistics with an uncorrected threshold of pUNC < 
0.005, after correction for multiple comparisons across the whole brain (WBC) to pFWE < 
0.05 using 3dFWHMx to estimate the smoothness of the residual images of each contrast 
and AlphaSim to calculate extent thresholds (AFNI, Cox 1996). A substantial number of 
studies have reported reward prediction error encoding in ventral striatum (Pagnoni et al. 
2002; O’Doherty et al. 2004; Pessiglione et al. 2006). Therefore, we also carried out small-
volume corrections (SVCs) on ventral striatum using an independent anatomical mask 
composed of two spherical ROIs of radius 5mm centered on the bilateral MNI coordinates of 
ventral striatum reported by a previous study of functional connectivity (Di Martino et al. 
2008).
Results
Behavioral results
We began by confirming that all participants chose the slot machine with the higher reward 
probability significantly more often than an agent choosing at random (p=0.5), as 
determined by a one-tailed binomial test. We then tested for a performance difference 
between the experiential and observational learning condition using a paired t-test (see 
Figure 2A). Again, performance was defined as the proportion of choice trials on which the 
slot machine with the higher win probability was chosen. We found significantly higher 
performance in the experiential learning condition relative to the observational learning 
condition (t(16)=2.26, p<0.04, two-tailed). Participants’ performance in the first half of the 
task (M = 0.84, SD = 0.11) in the experiential condition was significantly (t(16) = 2.54, p = 
0.02, two-tailed) better in the second half (M = 0.72, SD = 0.15). Participants’ performance 
in the observational condition did not differ between the first (M = 0.73, SD = 0.18) and 
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second half (M = 0.69, SD = 0.15) of the task. We found a significant effect of task 
difficulty, defined as the difference in the reward probabilities of the slot machines available 
for choice, on trial-by-trial performance in 9/17 participants in the experiential condition, 
and in 8/17 participants in the observational condition, after probit regressions. Levene’s 
tests did not indicate inhomogeneity of variance between their performance on the 
experiential and observational condition (F=0.004, p=0.95). Participants’ reaction times on 
observational free-choice trials (M = 827ms, SD = 115ms) were also significantly slower 
(t(16)=-2.59, p <0.02, two-tailed) than those on experiential free-choice trials (M = 776ms, 
SD = 123ms).
Neuroimaging results
Model-free learning signals—We tested for the presence of a relationship between 
BOLD activity and the model-derived RPEs, signals used by model-free learning algorithms 
to update the cached value of performing an action in a particular context (see Figure 3 and 
Table 1).
We found a significant effect of RPE in the experiential condition (RPEEXP) on BOLD in 
ventral striatum [pFWE < 0.05, SVC; x,y,z = 10,10,-6], as well as posterior cingulate [pFWE < 
0.05, WBC; x,y,z = 0,-38,32] and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex [pFWE < 0.05, WBC; x,y,z = 
-4,62,6]. With the exception of the activation in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, these effects 
were robust to deviations in the value of the learning rate parameter from the fitted value 
(see Table 1), consistent with a previous report (Wilson and Niv 2015). The RPEEXP effects 
in the first and second halves of the task did not differ significantly nor did their difference 
covary with performance differences in the experiential condition between the first and 
second halves. In contrast to our findings for RPEEXP, we found no positive or negative 
effect on BOLD of the RPE associated with the observed outcomes in the observational 
condition (RPEOBS) in our ventral striatum ROI after small-volume correction, or elsewhere 
at our whole-brain threshold. We do not believe this finding is attributable to imprecise 
fitting of the behavioral model parameters because this absence of RPEOBS encoding was 
robust to deviations in the learning rate parameter from the fitted value.
We then performed a formal two-tailed t-test on the differences between the effect of the 
RPE signal in the experiential and observational conditions (RPEOBS > RPEEXP, RPEEXP > 
RPEOBS). Of the areas we had found to be sensitive to RPEEXP, only ventral striatum [pFWE 
< 0.05, two-tailed; SVC; x,y,z = -6,10,-4] responded more strongly to RPEEXP than to 
RPEOBS. BOLD in a region of right middle occipital gyrus [pFWE < 0.05, two-tailed, WBC; 
x,y,z = 22,-84,10] was not significantly related to either RPEEXP or RPEOBS but showed a 
significantly more positive effect of RPEOBS than RPEEXP.
In order to determine whether these differences between experiential and observational 
learning in the neural encoding of RPE were associated with differences in task performance 
between the conditions, we repeated this two-tailed t-test, including a covariate representing 
the difference between the conditions in the proportion of choices for the slot machine with 
the greater probability of reward for each participant. Following this test, RPEEXP signaling 
in ventral striatum remained significantly greater than that of RPEOBS [pFWE < 0.05, two-
tailed; SVC; x,y,z = -6,10,-4], indicating that this difference is not attributable to 
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performance differences between experiential and observational learning. In contrast, the 
cluster in right middle occipital gyrus that showed a significantly more positive effect of 
RPEOBS than RPEEXP did not survive the inclusion of this covariate.
Model-based learning signals—Next we tested for the neural representation of SPEs, 
error signals used by model-based learning algorithms to update probabilistic 
representations of environmental contingencies linking actions to subsequent states
We found (see Figure 5 and Table 1) a significant effect of the SPE associated with the 
earned outcomes in the experiential condition (SPEEXP) in left intraparietal sulcus [pFWE < 
0.05, WBC; x,y,z = -48,-68,28] and right dorsomedial prefrontal cortex [pFWE < 0.05, WBC; 
x,y,z = 4,34,42]. We found significant effects of BOLD to SPEOBS in left intraparietal 
sulcus/inferior parietal lobule [pFWE < 0.05, WBC; x,y,z = -44,-62,42] as well as left 
precuneus [pFWE < 0.05, WBC; x,y,z = 4, -62, 40]. In contrast to the model-free RPE 
activations, these model-based SPE effects were highly sensitive to deviations in the value of 
the learning rate parameter from the fitted value, with none remaining significant at both 
alternative values (see Table 1). The effects of SPEEXP on BOLD in the first and second 
halves of the task also did not differ significantly nor did their difference covary with 
performance differences in the experiential condition between the first and second halves. 
After performing a two-tailed t-test on the difference between the effects of SPEEXP and 
SPEOBS, we found that BOLD in none of the areas that responded positively to either 
SPEEXP or SPEOBS exhibited an effects of SPEEXP that was significantly different from the 
effect of SPEOBS. A single region of right middle temporal gyrus showed a significantly 
more positive effect of SPEOBS than of SPEEXP [pFWE < 0.05, WBC; x,y,z = 40,-72,12], but 
because this area did not respond significantly to SPEOBS in its own right, we do not 
consider it further. Given the similarity of the neural effects of SPEEXP and SPEOBS, we 
merged the regressors into a single SPE regressor in order to provide a test with greater 
statistical power. However, this analysis did not reveal any additional regions that were 
uniquely sensitive to this merged SPE regressor (see Table 1).
No effects of task performance on BOLD—We did not find any effects of task 
performance on BOLD response to the cue on free- or forced-choice trials, to the outcome 
on forced-choice trials, or to the prediction error regressors in either the observational or 
experiential condition.
Discussion
In this study, we examined the neural correlates of computations underlying learning from 
the outcomes of actions we observe others take in the absence of choice.
We found that this form of observational learning differs significantly from its experiential 
analog in the neural representation of the RPE, a signal that can be used to update ‘cached’ 
model-free action values (Daw et al. 2005). BOLD activity correlated with model-free RPE 
during experiential learning in ventral striatum, replicating previous findings (Pagnoni et al. 
2002; O’Doherty et al. 2003; Pessiglione et al. 2006) as well as dmPFC, which has also 
previously been associated with both social and non-social prediction error signals (Behrens 
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et al. 2009, 2009; Yau and McNally 2015). However, activity in ventral striatum differed 
significantly during observational learning, with no evidence of an analogous observational 
RPE signal in ventral striatum at our testing threshold.
It is unlikely that this difference is attributable to gross differences in the visual, social, or 
motor properties of the conditions, which were controlled for by the use of condition-
specific event onset regressors. The absence of model-free signaling in the observational 
learning condition is also unlikely to reflect reduced salience of this condition because we 
successfully detect other, model-based, signals during observational learning. This selective 
encoding of RPE during experiential learning provides new insight into the computational 
role of ventral striatum, indicating that it may not be recruited for the acquisition of model-
free associations when we learn from the consequences of actions we observe others take. 
Our experiential and observational learning conditions necessarily differ in multiple respects 
that may have influenced what type of learning mechanism is engaged; most prominently, 
the presence of the observee and the receipt of reinforcement by the participant. An 
important goal for future research should be to identify what elements of observational 
learning give rise to this absence of RPE signaling in ventral striatum. It may be that the lack 
of experienced reward during observational learning prevents engagement of a model-free 
learning mechanism that relies on the receipt of reinforcement. Alternatively, the presence of 
the observee may suppress the use of model-free learning in favor of model-based updating 
strategies.
While in the current study participants could only observe the outcomes received by the 
observee and could not be influenced by their choice of action, in previous studies 
participants watched the observee make explicit choices between actions and receive the 
resulting outcomes (Burke et al. 2010; Suzuki et al. 2011; Cooper et al. 2012). From these 
studies, there is evidence to suggest that the differential sensitivity of ventral striatum to 
RPE encoding we find may not be limited to learning from the outcomes of actions taken in 
the absence of choice, although these studies did not explicitly test for differences between 
observational and experiential learning signals. Our finding that experiential but not 
observational learning is associated with RPE signaling in ventral striatum is consistent with 
that of Cooper et al. (2012), who reported sensitivity of BOLD in ventral striatum to RPE 
when participants learned from the outcomes of their choices in a multi-armed bandit task 
but find no such RPE effect when participants learned by observing another player perform 
the same task. Suzuki et al. (2012) also find RPE encoding in ventral striatum when 
participants chose between stimuli associated with probabilistic monetary reinforcement, but 
this BOLD effect in striatum is absent when participants learn to predict the choices of 
others by observing them perform the task. Interestingly, Burke et al. (2010) report a 
negative effect of RPE in ventral striatum associated with the outcomes of observed choices 
as well as positive RPE encoding during experiential learning. They also suggested however 
that this result could potentially be attributable to a social comparison effect, by which 
observing rewards being denied to another person may itself be rewarding (Delgado et al. 
2005; Fliessbach et al. 2007). Taken together, these results suggest that ventral striatum may 
not possess the computational flexibility required to allow the outcomes of actions we 
observe other social agents take to update stored values in the manner that experienced 
outcomes do. Alternatively, we cannot exclude the possibility that ventral striatum may only 
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engage in this form of updating in particularly evocative social contexts that have not yet 
been explored experimentally. This would be consistent with reports of modulation of 
ventral striatal BOLD responsiveness to reward received by others by interpersonal factors 
such as their perceived similarity to the participant (Mobbs et al. 2009) or whether they are 
cooperating or in competition with the participant (de Bruijn et al. 2009).
Previous studies have reported RPE effects accompanying observed outcomes in BOLD in 
dorsal striatum (Cooper et al. 2012) and vmPFC (Burke et al. 2010; Suzuki et al. 2012). 
When these results are taken together with the absence of RPE effects during observational 
learning in the current study, one possibility is that these neural circuits are more engaged 
during the processing of outcomes of observed actions that are freely chosen. This would 
echo accumulated evidence from studies of experiential learning indicating that dorsal 
striatum in particular is engaged selectively for model-free updating when actions can be 
freely chosen (O’Doherty et al. 2004; Gläscher et al. 2009; Cooper et al. 2012).
Despite the absence of model-free RPE signaling, participants’ choices clearly indicated that 
they used the observed outcomes to learn values for the bandits, potentially by relying 
instead on model-based learning. We found neural representations of SPE signals used by 
such an algorithm to update the probabilistic contingencies linking environmental states in 
response to both experienced and observed outcomes in our task in left intraparietal sulcus – 
a region that has been associated with SPE signals in previous studies (Gläscher et al. 2010; 
Liljeholm et al. 2013; Lee et al. 2014). Our findings represent the first time such signals 
have been tested for and observed during observational learning.
Interestingly, although model-based learning is frequently associated with greater 
computational flexibility, our observational learning condition demands no more 
computational flexibility than the experiential learning condition; the conditions do not 
differ in their task structure, or the reward information available to the participant. Thus, the 
fact that we find only model-based update signals during observational learning is 
unexpected, and demonstrates that model-based learning signals occur across a broader 
range of domains than model-free learning, even when the greater computational flexibility 
of model-based learning is not required.
It should be noted that the observational SPE signal we discuss here differs, both 
computationally and in terms of its neural substrates, from other error signals reported 
during observational learning (Behrens et al. 2008; Burke et al. 2010; Suzuki et al. 2012) 
that reflected violations of predictions about the actions an observee will choose to take. 
These were used to improve those predictions (Suzuki et al. 2012), to learn about the 
observee’s intentions (Behrens et al. 2008), or to bias ones own choices towards 
advantageous actions (Burke et al. 2010). In contrast, in our task the observee did not make 
choices between actions and the SPE signal instead reflected violations of the predicted 
consequences of the observee’s actions. In addition, while we found BOLD correlates of the 
observational SPE in left intraparietal sulcus and left precuneus, action prediction errors 
have been reported in dmPFC (Behrens et al. 2008; Suzuki et al. 2012) and dlPFC (Burke et 
al. 2010; Suzuki et al. 2012), suggesting that learning to predict the outcomes of others 
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actions by observation is implemented by neural circuits that are distinct from those used to 
learn to predict the actions themselves (Dunne and O’Doherty 2013).
In addition to learning by observing the consequences of others actions, humans can exploit 
other forms of non-experiential learning. For example, we can also learn from the 
consequences of actions we could have but did not take, or by fictive learning. This can be 
seen in the investor who, having bought shares in a public company, can learn about the 
shrewdness of his choice from the changing share price of not only the company he invested 
in, but other companies he chose not to invest in. This phenomenon has been explored from 
a model-free standpoint (Daw et al. 2005; Lohrenz et al. 2007; Li and Daw 2011) but it 
remains to be seen whether fictive learning may also be supported by the strengthening of 
model-based associations.
In summary, we demonstrate that when learning by observing the experiences of others in 
the absence of free-choice, state prediction errors signals associated with model-based 
learning are present in the frontoparietal network, while reward prediction error signals 
associated with model-free reinforcement learning are not evident. These results illustrate 
the adaptability of the model-based learning system, and suggest that its apparent ability to 
incorporate information gleaned from both the observation of the consequences of others’ 
actions and the experience of the outcomes of our own actions may be fundamental to our 
ability to efficiently assimilate diverse forms of information.
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New and Noteworthy
Here we describe evidence for both common and distinct neural computations during 
reward learning through observation and through direct experience. Specifically, we 
report encoding of a state prediction error signal associated with model-based 
reinforcement-learning in the frontoparietal network during observational as well as 
experiential learning. In contrast, although we find encoding of model-free reward 
prediction errors in ventral striatum during experiential learning, this signal is absent 
during observational learning.
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Figure 1. Task Schematic.
Participants completed a multi-armed bandit task, with an experiential and an observational 
learning condition. Individual slot machines were played on forced-choice trials and 
participants made choices between pairs of slot machines on free-choice trials. Each slot 
machine paid out a reward (€0.20) or nothing, with a reward probability that changed 
independently across machines and continuously throughout the task. On experiential 
forced-choice trials, the participant played the slot machine and earned the amount paid out, 
while on observational forced-choice trials they watched video of an observee playing the 
slot machine and earning the amount paid out. On all trials, a slot machine was selected for 
play within 2 seconds of the onset of a trial, after which the reels of that slot machine spun 
for 4 seconds. On forced-choice trials, the amount paid out was displayed for 2 seconds. On 
free-choice trials, the amount paid out was not displayed to the participant but was added to 
the participant’s earnings. All trials were followed by an ITI whose duration was drawn 
randomly from a discrete uniform distribution (min=1s, max=7s).
Dunne et al. Page 17
J Neurophysiol. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 June 24.
 Europe PM
C Funders A
uthor M
anuscripts
 Europe PM
C Funders A
uthor M
anuscripts
Figure 2. Behavioral performance.
Box plot of participants’ performance, defined as the proportion of free-choice trials on 
which the slot machine with the highest probability of paying out was chosen, in the 
experiential and observational conditions. Horizontal bar represents median performance, 
box represents interquartile range, and whisker ends represent maximum and minimum 
performance values. Average performance was higher in the experiential learning condition 
(mean = 0.77) than in the observational learning condition (mean = 0.71).
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Figure 3. Effect of reward prediction error in ventral striatum.
We found that BOLD activity in ventral striatum was sensitive to RPEs associated with 
outcomes that were earned (A), but found no RPE representation in ventral striatum 
associated with outcomes that were observed (B). The differences between the effects of 
experiential and observational RPEs were significant in ventral striatum (C). SPMs of the 
effects (left) are overlaid on the group mean normalized anatomical image and thresholded 
at pUNC <0.005 and pUNC < 0.001 for the purpose of illustration. Histograms (right) 
represent the frequency of voxel-wise t-statistics in our bilateral ventral striatum ROI. For 
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the contrast of negative effect of RPEOBS, no voxels in our ROI survive an uncorrected 
threshold of pUNC < 0.005
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Figure 4. Effects of state prediction error.
We found effects of SPEEXP on BOLD (pFWE < 0.05, WBC) in left intraparietal sulcus and 
right dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, and effects of SPEOBS in left intraparietal sulcus/inferior 
parietal lobule and left precuneus. A two-tailed t-test indicated that none of these clusters 
showed a significantly different effect of SPEEXP than of SPEOBS. SPMs are overlaid on the 
group mean normalized anatomical image and thresholded at pUNC < 0.005 and pUNC < 
0.001 for the purpose of illustration.
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Table 1
Peak co-ordinates of all significantly activated clusters, related to Figures 3,4, and 5; 1pFWE < 0.05 at cluster-
level after whole-brain correction and a height threshold of pUNC < 0.005; 2pFWE < 0.05 at peak-level after 
small volume correction and a height threshold of pUNC < 0.005; 3Survives correction for multiple 
comparisons with a learning rate of 0.05; 4Survives correction for multiple comparisons with a learning rate of 
0.25.
Contrast Region x y z
RPEEXP Posterior cingulate* 0 -38 32
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex*  -4 62 6
Right ventral striatum** 10 10 -6
RPEOBS > RPEEXP Right middle occipital gyrus* 22 -84 10
RPEEXP > RPEOBS Left ventral striatum** -6 10 -4
SPEOBS Left precuneus* -4 -62 40
Left intraparietal sulcus/inferior parietal lobule* -44 -62 42
SPEEXP Left intraparietal sulcus* -48 -68 28
Right dorsomedial prefrontal cortex   4 34 42
SPEOBS > SPEEXP Right middle temporal gyrus* 40 -72 12
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